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 UNCERTAINTY AND THE THEORY OF TAX INCIDENCE
 IN A STOCK MARKET ECONOMY*
 BY DAVID P. BARON AND ROBERT FORSYTHE1
 1. INTRODUCTION
 Commencing with Harberger's [1962] classic paper, a number of studies2 have
 analyzed the incidence of taxation in the context of a deterministic, two-sector,
 two-factor general equilibrium model. Recently, R. N. Batra [1975] and R. A.
 Ratti and P. Shome [1977a, 1977b] have reexamined the robustness of these
 deterministic results for the case in which production uncertainty is incorporated
 into the model. By using "entrepreneurial" models in which the firm is assumed
 to maximize the expected utility of profits, they find that the incidence of taxes
 depends on the preferences and probability assessments of the entrepreneur, and
 in general, the deterministic results no longer obtain.
 Most firms, however, are not owned by a single individual, and Batra and
 Ratti and Shome do not indicate how appropriate their results are for other
 ownership forms. In particular, their models do not utilize any form of risk-
 sharing arrangements such as those available through the securities markets. In
 the presence of a stock market, it will be shown that the deterministic results of
 Harberger continue to hold for the firm in their economy if the firm has publicly-
 traded securities and acts in the best interests of its shareholders. With this
 shareholders' interests criterion and the Batra-Ratti-Shome model, the securities
 market is sufficient to separate the production decisions of the firm from the
 portfolio-consumption decisions of shareholders.3 In a related analysis, Baron
 and Forsythe [1979] focus on the role of the securities market in establishing
 unanimity among shareholders about the value maximization criterion for firms.
 Here, the emphasis is on the impact of taxes on production and factor rewards.
 Because of separation and the Harberger assumption that aggregate demand is
 unaffected by the tax rate, the equilibrium in the securities, output, and factor
 markets has the same qualitative properties as in a deterministic model, and the
 standard propositions regarding the incidence of taxation continue to hold. If
 we alter the Harberger assumption that there is no direct tax effect, we will show
 that a sufficient condition for his results to continue to hold is that all individuals
 exhibit nondecreasing absolute risk aversion. For expositional purposes only,
 the analysis will be limited to the study of the effect of the corporate income tax,
 * Manuscript received September 4, 1979; revised March 31, 1981.
 1 The first author's work has been supported by NSF Grant #SOC 77-07251. We wish to
 thank Frank Milne and Assaf Razin for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper.
 2 These include Johnson [1956], Mieszkowski [1967], Wells [1955].
 3 An analysis of the conditions needed for this separation may be found in Baron [1979].
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 but in the final section the results for other forms of taxation, such as those
 considered by Mieszkowski [1967], will be shown to extend also to the stochastic
 economy considered here.
 2. THE MODEL AND EQUILIBRIUM
 2.1. Firms. Following the specification of Harberger, a two-factor model
 is considered in which X1 is produced in the corporate sector and X2 is the non-
 corporate sector. Production takes place under conditions of perfect competition,
 full employment, inelastic factor supplies, and irreversible factor intensities. The
 quantities of capital and labor employed in the j-th sector are denoted by K
 and Lj, respectively, and K and L are the total fixed supplies of each factor.
 The output of the corporate sector is subject to uncertainty with a production
 function of the form
 X1 = xF,(Kl, L1),
 where o is a random variable, o>0, representing exogenous and uncertain in-
 fluences affecting output. The output of the noncorporate sector is assumed to
 be deterministic and given by
 X=F2(K2, L2).
 Although each sector is assumed to be composed of many firms, only a represen-
 tative firm in each sector will be analyzed in order to simplify the notation. The
 production functions Fj, j=1, 2, are assumed to be linear homogeneous and
 concave so that
 Fj(Kj, Lj) = Ljjfj(kj) j 1, 2,
 where kj is the capital-labor ratio in sector j, f 5 >0, and f 'J <0.
 It is assumed that firms make 'their input decisions at the beginning of the
 period, prior to the realization of a, by contracting for labor' at the competitive
 wage rate w, and by financing their capital purchases by selling bonds, B1=Kj,
 j = 1, 2, which yield a deterministic gross rate of return r (rj ? 1) determined in a
 securities market. At the completion of trades in the securities and factor markets,
 the contracted levels of inputs are employed and an outcome of o is realized, as
 is output. The market clearing price in the corporate sector output market
 depends on or and hence is uncertain at the time input decisions are made.
 Ratti and Shome [1977a] recognize that the price is uncertain but, in order to
 avoid dealing with price uncertainty, they assume a small country for which pro-
 duct prices are given by world markets. Batra does not make the small country
 assumption, yet assumes that the output price is not random. In noting this,
 Ratti and Shome [1977b] suggest that when assuming a large country, the price
 which equates expected demand to expected supply should be used. As will be
 demonstrated, these assumptions are unnecessary, since an uncertain price does
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 not affect the standard tax incidence results for the model considered here.4
 When the output market clears, factors are paid their wages, and the after-tax
 earnings are then distributed to shareholders in proportion to their holdings.
 Finally, it is assumed that all commitments to factor inputs are met and that there
 is no risk of default on the bond obligations.5 Letting p(a) denote the price
 of output in the first sector expressed in terms of the price in the second sector,
 the after-tax earnings 17((a) of the corporate sector may be expressed as
 H17(a) = (1 - t) [p()xF1(K1, L1) - rB1 - wL,]
 = (1 - t) [p(cc)ccL1f1(k1) - L1(r1k1 + w)],
 where t is the corporate income tax rate. The tax system is assumed to be such
 that the corporate tax involves full loss offset. The earnings of the noncorporate
 sector are given by
 (1) H2 = F2(K2, L2) -r2B 2 =L2 f2(k2)-L2(r2k2 + w).
 Adopting the view of Harberger [p. 215] that the corporation income tax is one
 "which strikes the earnings of capital in the corporate sector, but not in the
 noncorporate sector," the return on the debt as well as the equity of a firm in the
 first sector is subject to the tax. In this case, the appropriate equilibrium condition
 in the bond market is
 (1-t) r1 r.
 Thus, the after-tax return to the equity of the corporate sector can be rewritten as
 (2) H1(a) = (1 - t)[p(a)aL1f1(k) - wL1] - rk1Ll.
 It should be clear from this formulation that the Harberger assumption requires
 that interest payments are not deductible as usually is assumed in the finance
 literature. If interest were deductible, the after-tax return to equity in sector one
 would be
 (3) H1(oc) = (1 - t) [p(o)xL1f1(k1) - wL1 - rkLl],
 since equilibrium in the bond market would require
 To parallel the Harberger analysis, the specification given by (2) is used throughout
 the remainder of the paper. If interest payments are deductible, however, the
 imposition of a corporate income tax is neutral, since it has no effect on the equi-
 librium in this model, and for realizations of a for which profits are positive
 (negative), the corporate income tax is exactly a lump-sum tax (subsidy) as Stiglitz
 I This result depends importantly on the form of the production function since it is linear
 in a.
 5 The same results will obtain if there is default risk but no bankruptcy costs, as demonstrated
 in Baron [1976].
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 [1973] and King [1975] have shown.
 2.2. Consumers. At the beginning of the period, consumers are assumed to
 make portfolio decisions and to allocate their labor and capital to firms, while at
 the end of the period they purchase commodities using their factor payments plus
 their share of the profits distributed by firms. At the end of the period consumer
 i's consumption problem, conditional on a, is
 maximize Ui(Cf, C )
 C i , C 2
 1' 2
 subject to p(aO)Ci + C < I< O),
 where Ui(Ct, Ci) is an ordinal, concave utility function for the two commodities
 and Ii(ca) is the income of consumer i when ao? is the realization of X.6
 Consumer i is assumed to be initially endowed with fixed amounts of labor
 Li and capital Ki which may be hired by firms at prices w and r, respectively.
 Each consumer i is also endowed with a portfolio consisting of ownership shares,
 yi, of the corporate sector firms. A consumer may sell his shares in the securities
 market at the market price V1 and may purchase new shares yi and bonds bi.
 Since the noncorporate sector does not include publicly-traded firms, it is assumed
 that consumers receive a fixed share, 7i, of their profits.7 8 Thus, income
 available for consumption is given by
 (4) Ii(a) =Yv71i) + yI72 + rbi + wLi.
 Each consumer is assumed to have a subjective probability assessment of a
 which may be represented by the absolutely continuous, distribution function
 Gi(a). At the beginning of the period each consumer solves the portfolio problem
 maximize EVui(IP(a), p(cx))
 (5) Yl b
 subject to yVI + b<y i? V + Ki,
 where u(IP(a), p(a)) obtained from (3) is consumer i's indirect utility function
 which is assumed to be strictly concave in Ii(a), and Ei denotes the expectation
 operator.9
 2.3. Security and Factor Market Equilibrium. It is assumed that firms act
 6 The reformulation given in this section is based on that given in Helpman and Razin [1978]
 and used in Baron and Forsythe [1979]. The optimal consumption is a function of p(a) and
 1P(a) and hence indirectly a function of a.
 I If the noncorporate sector is viewed as being composed of institutions such as mutual
 companies or mutual savings associations, trading in ownership shares could be considered.
 Similarly, if farms are included in that sector, consumers could purchase or sell acreage or enter
 into sharecropping arrangements.
 8 This analysis allows for noncorporate firms which may be wholly owned by a single in-
 dividual. If individual i' owns such a firm, then y7'=1 and y72=0 for iVi'.
 1 For a detailed derivation of this indirect utility approach, see Milne [1979].
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 in the best interest of their shareholders and in this model it can be shown that
 shareholders unanimously prefer that the firm maximizes its market value. Since
 uncertainty enters linearly into the returns of firms in the corporate sector, it is
 easy to show that the random component of the return, p(a)a, can be obtained by
 a linear combination of existing securities, i.e.,
 p((X)CX -III1((x) + l2H2
 where
 = I ~~~~~~L [I- t)w + rk1]
 (1 - t)Llfl(kl) and (12 = - t)Ljf,(k,)F12
 Given this spanning property, the "price," p*/r, of the random component
 p(oc)xo of the return is the market certainty equivalent of the random variable
 p(oc)cx discounted to the beginning of the period. Due to the multiplicative nature
 of uncertainty, the market certainty equivalent may be determined directly from
 the market value of the corporate sector firm, the inputs, and the factor prices.'0
 By assuming that the input decisions of one firm have a negligible effect on the
 availability of inputs of other firms and that all consumers perceive that the
 profit and market value of a given firm is independent of the decisions of any other
 firm, it may be shown that all shareholders prefer that firms in the corporate sector
 maximize their market value" given by
 (6) V1 - r -t)p*Llfl(kl) 1[(I - t)w + rk1]}.
 The preferred input levels for firms maximize the values V, and 12 and satisfy12
 (7) (1 -t)p*f'(kl) -r =
 (8) (1 - (p*f (kl) - w) - rk1 = 0
 (9) f2(k2) - r = 0
 and
 0 The price p*/r is given by
 r r
 = r(Vi+k1Lj)+(I-t)wL,
 r(Lj f1(k1) (1-t))
 11 These conditions are derived by maximizing the consumer's expected utility at a securities
 market equilibrium. The derivation will not be presented here, since analogous conditions
 are derived in Baron and Forsythe [1979].
 12 As Milne [1976, 1979] has shown, the reduction of the asset economy to one in which
 (i) consumers solve the portfolio problem in (5)
 (ii) corporate firms maximize their market value in (6)
 (iii) noncorporate firms maximize their profits in (1),
 is isomorphic to a certainty economy in which the price is p*.
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 (10) f2(k2) - W - rk2 = 0-
 An equilibrium in factor markets requires that the returns to factors be the same
 in both sectors, so
 (11) p*(l - t)f (kl) =f2(k2)
 and
 (12) p*(fi(kl) - klf(kl)) = f2(k2) - k2(k2).
 At an equilibrium resources are fully employed, so
 (13) K = 2Ki = L1k1 + L2k2
 (14) L= EL = L1 + L2.
 It is assumed that an equilibrium exists and that positive amounts of both com-
 modities are produced.
 Some additional work is required to derive the output market clearing con-
 dition in this model. To accomplish this, it is useful to think of a firm as producing
 a bundle of "outputs" defined across states of the world. In this model there are
 two such outputs: the first provides the consumer with p(c?x)c?x units of income if
 the realization of a is ocx; the second provides one unit of income independent of
 the realization of a. Substituting (6) into the budget constraint of the consumer's
 problem in (5) and rearranging terms, it can be seen that
 r[(1 - t)yiLjf1(kj)] + - {-yL[(t - t)w + rkl] + rbi}.r r
 -< [(1-t)7jLlfl(kj)] + l - t)w + rk1] + rKi}. r ~~1r
 Thus, consumer i is endowed with f = (1- t)yjLlfl(kj) of output one and Z2=
 {- iLj [(1-t)w + rkj] + rKi} units of output two and the consumer purchases
 = (1- t)yLLj f1(k1) of output one and z2 = {-7yiLj [(1-t)w + rk1] + rbi} units
 of output two. Thus, the reformulated budget constraint becomes
 (15) 1P*Z1 + Z2]_< [P*21 2
 Given the reformulation in (15), the demand function for the first output can be
 derived given a distribution of the tax proceeds. The tax on the corporate sector
 may be interpreted as a payment of tL1f1(k1) units of the first output and - twL1
 units of the second output from that sector to the government. The government
 is assumed to distribute a portion ti of each output to individual i, where i tN =1,
 so that the tax is fully distributed. Individual i's expected indirect utility function
 may be expressed in terms of the two outputs as
 (16) Eiui(p(oc)oxzf + z2 + wDi + y H2 + 1itLj(p(oe)oef1(k) - w), p(a)),
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 which is to be maximized subject to (15). The demand function for the first output
 is a function Di which may be expressed as
 Z = Di(p*, t I i:)
 and aggregate demand D is given by
 (17) D(p*, t I (1i))= Di(p*, t I qi)
 where (hi) is the vector of distribution shares over individuals.'3
 The assumption made by Harberger is that the distribution of the tax revenue
 is such that the aggregate demand function depends only on p* and hence can be
 expressed as D*(p*). The supply of output one is Ni-2f=Llfl(kl), so in equi-
 librium
 (18) D*(p*) - Llfl(kl) = 0.
 The equilibrium in this model is thus characterized by the system of five equations
 (11)-(14) and (18) in five unknowns k1, k2, L1, L2, and p*, which can be analyzed
 in the standard manner to obtain Harberger's results. 14
 If the aggregate demand function depends directly on t, the analysis of the effect
 of the corporate tax is more complicated. To identify the direct effect of the tax,
 solve (15) as an equality for zi, substitute into (16) and differentiate with respect
 to zi to obtain the first-order condition
 Eu i(p(a)4 - p*) = 0
 where uj denotes auil/8I(ac). Total differentiation yields
 (19) -dzf _ Eui 1(p (a) -p*)L (p(a)afi(k) - w)
 di Eui 1(p(L)L_ p*)2
 where the denominator is negative due to the strict concavity of the indirect
 utility function. To sign the numerator, we know from (8), that
 wL1 = p*Lljf(kl)_ rk(L_
 so that (19) may be written as
 (20) -d -t11f(, iirk,Ll Euiipxcp* (20) d~-= _ q'Llfi(kl) - (l II WOOL- E-~ _p*)2 dt (1 - t) Eui (p(c*)c* p*)2
 The first term in (20) is negative and thus if the second terms is nonpositive,
 each individual's demand for units of output one decreases with increases in the
 tax rate. Using the method of Arrow [1971, p. 119] it can be shown that if an
 individual's measure of absolute risk aversion is nondecreasing then
 13 The demand for the first output determines the demand for the second output as a con-
 sequence of full employment.
 14 Harberger evaluated his results at t=O.
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 (21) Eul I(p(c)c _ p*)2-
 and thus, from (20), individual demand for z{ will vary inversely with the tax rate.
 However, Arrow also has shown that the expression in (21) is individual i's income
 effect with regard to changes in the risky output z4, and so the assumption of
 nondecreasing absolute risk aversion implies that the risky output is an inferior
 good. Thus, with decreasing absolute risk aversion it must be the case that income
 effects are small in order to obtain the desired result that dzi/dt<O. Further,
 it should be noted that this result is stronger than required since, in fact, what we
 wish to assume is that
 _ D(p*, tl(qi)) = E dzt <o
 at dt
 In the case of a direct tax effect, the market clearing condition may be written as
 (22) D(p*, t I (qi)) = Llfl(kl))
 and the equilibrium of this model may now be analyzed by examing this equation
 along with equations (11)-(14). As shown in Baron and Forsythe [1981] an
 increase in the corporate income tax increases the wage paid to labor and decreases
 the return to capital. This result is qualitatively the same as Harberger who
 assumes that there is no direct tax effect and that the equilibrium is evaluated at
 t=O.
 3. DISCUSSION
 Batra and Ratti and -Shome find that when firms maximize the expected utility
 of profits, the results of Harberger and Mieszkowski fail to obtain. For example,
 Batra concludes that Harberger's principal result turns on the behavior of firm's
 relative and absolute risk aversion, since the factor returns in his model are
 dependent upon the utility functions and probability assessments of firms. If
 the securities of a firm are traded and production is subject to multiplicative
 uncertainty, the securities market establishes a certainty equivalent price that
 firms can use in planning their inputs in a manner directly analogous to that in a
 deterministic model. Using Harberger's assumptions, the certainty equivalent
 price separates production decisions from a consumer's consumption-portfolio
 decisions, so the reduced form of the model analyzed here is isomorphic to a cer-
 tainty economy. In fact, the system of equations, (11)-(14) and (18), are identical
 to those analyzed by Harberger, and hence, the results he obtains under certainty
 also hold under uncertainty.'5 Contrary to Batra's conclusion, if the corporate
 sector is capital intensive relative to the noncorporate sector, then in proportion to
 its share of national income capital will bear a greater burden of the corporate
 15 For a full derivation of these results see Baron and Forsythe [1981].
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 income tax than labor. Furthermore, the analysis of partial- factor taxes also is
 straightforward in this model and, with the methodology developed here,
 Mieszkowski's results can be shown to extend to this stochastic economy.
 Studies of firm behavior under- uncertainty that represent the objectives of firms
 in terms of the preferences and expectations of a decision maker, either an en-
 trepreneur or a manager, will necessarily conclude that those preferences and
 expectations influence production decisions unless a market is present that prices
 out the uncertainty in the model.'6 The tax incidence results of Batra and Ratti
 and Shome are thus applicable to firms owned and operated by a single entre-
 preneur but not to publicly-traded firms that are managed in the interests of their
 shareholders. An alternative justification for the expected utility maximization
 objective of a firm is that it is descriptive of managerial decision-making when
 ownership is separated from the control of a firm. Even in the case of a manager
 who maximizes an arbitrary expected utility function, however, Baron and
 Forsythe have shown that separation obtains if the firm trades its own shares
 through treasury purchases. The conclusions of deterministic theory are then
 applicable.
 - To argue that uncertainty compromises the results of deterministic theory in a
 model in which the uncertainty enters in a linear manner thus requires rather special
 assumptions about the owner or manager of the firm. In a more general model,
 however, the necessary separation may not result. The correspondence between
 the uncertainty model considered here and the deterministic model results because
 the return vector (across states) of a corporate sector firm is spanned by the return
 vectors of the securities traded in the stock market. When .the technology of the
 firm is such that this spanning property is not satisfied, shareholders will no longer,
 in general, be in agreement with respect to their preferences for the decisions of a
 firm, and hence there is no unambiguous objective for the firm to pursue. In
 this case there is little guidance as to how the firm should make its decisions and
 hence no framework in which the incidence of taxes can be investigated.
 Stanford University, U.S.A.
 University of Iowa, U.S.A.
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